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SCHUBERT OGDEN ON TRUTH, 
MEANINGFULNESS, AND 
RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE 
Mark S. McLeod / Westmont College 
I wish to discuss some problems arising in Schubert Ogden's view of 
religious language. These problems can be appreciated only by grasping 
several of his key definitions, and thus section I is largely expository. 
Section II draws together several of Ogden's claims about language and 
faith. In so doing it shows an inconsistency, suggesting that his theory 
of religious language is incomplete. In the final section I discuss three 
problems with Ogden's understanding of necessary assertion, truth, and 
meaningfulness. 
I. 
For Ogden, theology is a methodical attempt to bring together the 
meaning of the Christian witness of faith and the truth about human 
existence, evaluating carefully the question whether the former ex 
presses the latter.1 He writes: 
Properly understood, the task of Christian theology is the 
fully reflective understanding of the Christian witness of 
faith as decisive for human existence. Consequently, to 
achieve this task, theological reflection is required to pursue 
two essential ends: (1) to see to the appropriateness of its 
assertions, in the sense of their congruence in meaning with 
the Christian witness of faith; and (2) to see to the under 
standability of its assertions, in the sense of their meaning 
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the works of Schubert M. 
Ogden. Cf. "The Point of Christology," The Journal of Religion 55 (October 
1975): 375; and "Present Prospects for Empirical Theology," in The Future of 
Empirical Theology, ed. Bernard Meland (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1969), p. 66. 
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 and truth in terms of the conditions established with ex 
istence as such.2 
The Christian witness to which he refers includes biblical, historical, 
and contemporary expressions of faith; "the level of concepts and 
symbols which comes to exist insofar as Christians undertake somehow 
to formulate and express their faith in Jesus as the Christ."3 Theology 
is a critical reflection on the Christian witness, and as such is an 
attempt to vindicate the truth claims found therein.4 
Relying on some distinctions formulated by Stephen Toulmin,5 
Ogden suggests that to say is true is to "commend it as worthy of 
being believed or accepted."6 "Truth" is an evaluative term, much like 
"good" or "beautiful." It does "not merely express a subjective prefer 
ence, but has the force of claiming objective worth-specifically, of 
assessing a given assertion as in itself deserving of credence."7 To 
assert that a proposition is true is to assert (at least minimally) that it 
is valuable to believe the proposition. Finally, the meaning of the term 
"truth" remains constant, but the criteria for truth vary from case to 
case, or "field" to "field."8 Thus to discover whether is true, one 
must first discover the field of discourse to which belongs and then 
whether utterances in that field can be said to be true or false. 
For Ogden, the statements of the Christian witness and theology 
can be true. In other words, theological statements are in a field of 
discourse such that truth can be predicated of its members. Consider, 
for example, some comments about "myth": 
'Myth' may be defined by means of three closely related 
statements. First, 'myth' refers to a certain language or 
form of speaking which, like other languages, functions to 
2. "The Authority of Scripture for Theology," Interpretation 30 (July 1976): 244. 
3. "The Point of Christology," 375. 
4. "Truth, Truthfulness and Secularity," Christianity and Crisis 31 (April 5, 1971): 
58. 
5. Cf. Stephen Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950) and The Uses of Argument 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958). 
6. "Myth and Truth" in The Reality of God and Other Essays (New York: Har 
per and Row. Publishers, 1966), p.11. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid., p. 112. 
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represent (to re-present, to present again) some field of 
human experience in a particular way. Second, the field of 
experience that the language of myth represents is our 
original internal awareness of our selves and the world as 
included in the circumambient reality within which all things 
come to be, are what they are, and pass away. Third, the 
particular way in which the language of myth represents this 
awareness is in terms and categories based in our derived 
external perception of reality as the object of our ordinary 
experience.9 
The influence of Bultmann is obvious; demythologizing is a program to 
be followed.10 That is, "to claim that a given mythical assertion is 
true, although not literally so, is to commit oneself to state the mean 
ing of the assertion at some point in non-mythical terms."11 Ogden's 
criterion for the truth of myth is that "... mythical assertions are 
true insofar as they so explicate our unforfeitable assurance that life is 
worth while that the understanding of faith they represent cannot be 
falsified by the essential conditions of life itself [italics his].12 Thus 
a myth is true only if it is unfalsified by and explicative of faith 
understood as "the confidence or assurance that life as such is worth 
living."13 
Two notions remain in need of explanation. First, in discussing 
experience Ogden distinguishes three levels. Consider three senses of 
the term "empirical." First is the logical positivist's limited notion of 
the empirical as the data of the five physical senses. Second is the 
empirical which, following existentialist philosophy, includes the nonsen 
suous. "It is defined by the understanding that sense perception is 
neither the only nor even the primary mode of experience, but is 
rather derived from a still more elemental awareness both of ourselves 
and of the world around us."14 Third is the sense of empirical deriving 
9. Ibid., p. 104. 
10. Christ Without Myth: A Study Based on the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann 
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1961). The Bultmannian her 
meneutical program is not only championed by Ogden, but promoted in a more 
radical form. 
11. "Myth and Truth," p. 108. 
12. Ibid., p. 116. 
13. Ibid., p. 114. 
14. "Present Prospects for Empirical Theology," p. 78. 
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from Whiteheadian philosophy, which allows not only for a sense of 
ourselves and other creatures, but a sense of worth, the Whole, or, in 
Whitehead's terms, "the sense of Deity" or "the intuition of holiness."15 
Whitehead's empiricism is quite broad, but, according to Ogden, it 
allows for both a successful empirical theology and for the meaningful 
ness of religious utterance. 
The last notion is metaphysics. Metaphysics is a "distinct field of 
inquiry, whose task it is to raise to the level of reflective self-con 
sciousness the fundamental assertions that must somehow be made by 
each of us and that none of us can meaningfully deny."16 Metaphysical 
claims, if they are to be meaningful, are subject to two demands: that 
they are logically consistent (both with themselves and with others) and 
that they apply "through our human experience." 
There are two types of metaphysical statement, contingent and 
necessary. Both, however, are existential. The criterion of truth for 
metaphysical statements is that 'Those statements are true meta 
physically which I could not avoid believing to be true, at least im 
plicitly, if I were to believe or exist at all, or alternatively, they are 
the statements which would necessarily apply through any of my ex 
periences, even my merely conceivable experiences, provided only that 
such an experience was sufficiently reflected upon."17 Necessary 
metaphysical statements are "utterly positive and non-exclusive in their 
applications through experience."18 Contingent metaphysical statements 
are not. "I exist," for example, need not be part of God's experience, 
when it is said of some human being. What makes "I exist" true is the 
contingent state of affairs that I exist. Thus contingent metaphysical 
statements must be believed by some believer, that is, by some human 
believer, if true at all, but not by all believers. Necessary metaphysical 
statements must be believed by all believers, viz., human and divine. 
Necessary metaphysical statements are unfalsifiable by experience. 
Drawing together the claims about metaphysical assertions and 
experience, Ogden suggest that all metaphysical statements are empirical 
and therefore existential, although not in the positivist sense. The test 
for meaningfulness is an empirical test, but of course "empirical" is to 
15. Ibid., pp. 79, 80, 85. 
16. "God and Philosophy: A Discussion with Anthony Flew," in The Journal of 
Religion 48 (April 1968): 171. 
17. The Criterion of Metaphysical Truth and the Senses of Metaphysics," Process 
Studies 5 (Spring 1975): 47. 
18. "God and Philosophy," p. 171. 
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Vbe taken in the widest possible way. Necessary metaphysical assertions 
are verified by all experience, but cannot be falsified by any. 
II. 
How does Ogden understand religious language? For Ogden, the 
complex experience of existence-of myself, others, and the 
whole-is the experience out of which all religious language 
arises and in terms of which it must be understood. In this 
sense all religious language, including the word 'God,' is 
existential language, the language in which we express and 
refer to our own existence as selves related to others and to 
the whole.19 
Religious assertions, then, are existential, but it is only the most 
fundamental which cannot be falsified. "Whatever must be said of its 
grammar, the logic of 'the religious hypothesis' ... is the logic of 
existential assertions-the most fundamental of which neither are nor 
could be merely factual" [italics his].20 
The most fundamental religious statements, on this account, are 
metaphysical. What of religious assertions which are not metaphysical? 
If there are factual religious assertions, surely they are falsifiable. 
While he claims that "the foundational statements of religion, or, at any 
rate, of Christianity, logically cannot be factually falsified,"21 this 
claim "emphatically does not settle as it might be supposed to, the 
basic issue of falsification and belief, so far, at least, as specifically 
Christian belief is concerned."22 It seems, then, that some statements 
of Christian witness are factually falsifiable. 
Recall the three senses of "empirical" noted above. I suggest that 
corresponding to these are three kinds of statements: the factual, the 
contingent existential, and the necessary existential. The first are on 
the level of science, the second on the level of nonsensuous experience, 
19. "How Does God Function in Human Life?" Christianity and Crisis 27 (May 15, 
1967): 106. 
20. "Theology and Falsification in Retrospect': A Reply," in The Logic of God: 
Theology and Verification, ed. Malcolm L. Diamond and Thomas V. Litzenburg 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1975), pp. 293, 294. 
21. "Falsification and Belief," a review of Falsification and Belief by Alasdair 
McKinnon, in Religious Studies 10 (March 1974): 40. 
22. Ibid. 
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related to worldly creatures, and the third on the level of nonsensuous 
experience, but related to God. On Ogden's view, these three levels of 
language each have their own test of meaningfulness. For the factual, 
he admits a positivistic type of falsifiability. The contingent existential 
assertions, corresponding to nonsensuous experience, are in principle 
falsifiable by conceivable, nonsensuous experience. These statements 
include claims about one's existence and the world as we are related to 
it, and are falsifiable in the face of those contingent "facts." (I might, 
after all, not have come into existence.) Necessary existential claims, 
being utterly positive, are open to neither sort of falsification, but, 
according to Ogden, are falsifiable nonetheless. How can this be? He 
writes: 
Despite Flew's assumption . . . that the falsifiability of this 
assertion [that God exists] and its empirical falsifiability are 
simply the same, there is an important difference between 
them. The assertion that God is real, though not, on my 
view, even in principle empirically falsifiable, is not, for all 
of that, beyond the possibility of being false. For, were the 
many thinkers correct who profess to find the very idea of 
God incoherent, the assertion of God's reality would be not 
only falsifiable but false, and necessarily false at that. That 
is, it could not not be false-even though obviously, that 
kind of falsity would be something quite different from the 
merely empirical kind.23 
Such assertions, if true, are necessarily true, and verified by all ex 
perience. But, according to Ogden, they could be false. This is sup 
posed to be the case since the foundational assertions of Christianity 
may simply be confused or self-contradictory. This kind of falsification 
is the only kind applicable to metaphysical, noncontingent assertions. 
(By way of critical note, one must say that this is indeed an odd use 
of "falsifiable." The claim that necessary truths could be false seems 
confused unless, perhaps, Ogden wants to make a distinction between 
what is as a matter of fact really necessary and what merely appears, 
epistemically, to be necessary.) 
Accordingly, whenever one shows a particular assertion to be 
meaningful, one also shows it to be true. The very nature of such 
metaphysical assertions is to be verified by all experience. Thus "in 
23. "Response," The Perkins School of Theology Journal 26 (Winter 1973): 52. 
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the case of theological assertions which in their logic are metaphysical 
. . ., to establish their meaning by reference to experience is equivalent 
to establishing their truth; for either they can be shown to refer 
through all possible experience, or else they are doubtfully meaningful 
as metaphysical assertions."24 Such statements are verified by all 
experience, falsified by none. To be meaningful, in their case, is to be 
empirically unfalsifiable. But to be true as necessary assertions is to 
be compatible with all experience. If meaningful (not self-con 
tradictory), then true. If true at all, then necessarily true. 
How should we understand Ogden's theory of religious language? 
He suggests that there is a continuum from faith to theology. At the 
highest end of the continuum one has theological reflection-critical 
reflection on the witness of faith and human existence. At the other 
end one has the faith of humankind, where "faith" is to be understood 
as (a Heideggerian type of) existential self-understanding. Ogden's 
suggested continuum can be used to draw together all the pieces of the 
picture. 
"Faith," "witness," and "theology" are all "understandings," yet 
each is on a different level so far as reflection is concerned. Theology 
is objective knowledge (in the existential sense, which can be accounted 
for, according to Ogden, under both kinds of nonsensuous experience). 
Witness is proclamation on a less reflective level, the mythical expres 
sion of the existential understanding of the believer.25 
In connection with Ogden's use of "faith" some confusion appears. 
Consider these comments: 
I should agree immediately that there is something profoundly 
mistaken in supposing that faith itself either must or could 
be directly verified .... [Where the question of rationally 
justifying faith] does properly arise is at the level of thought 
and speech through which the existential understanding of 
faith is theologically explicated-provided, of course, that 
such thought and speech are held to have some genuine 
cognitive import.26 
24. "The Task of Philosophical Theology," in The Future of Philosophical 
Theology, ed. R. Evans (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1971), p. 80. 
25. There are several varieties of witness, the most concrete being parables, but 
this is not germane to the argument. Cf. some comments on parables by 
Whitehead, cited by Ogden in The Reality of God and Other Essays, p. 81. 
26. "Theology and Objectivity," pp. 92, 93. 
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Here we are told that faith is not a witness or proclamation itself, but 
rather that which is being explicated by such witness. Further: 
Even though faith itself is a strictly existential phenomenon, 
the witness of faith, in the sense of the actual life of the 
believer in loving service, perforce takes place in nature 
and history and therefore has its necessary empirical aspect. 
If one is to love his neighbour as himself by serving him in 
his actual needs and above all, by explicitly confronting him 
with the decision of faith, one must always risk some em 
pirical understanding of his actual historical situation in its 
limitations and opportunities for relevant action.27 
Here again, faith Is the life of the believer, the existential situation, 
and Ogden clearly distinguishes it from the empirical outworkings of 
the existential situation. The latter is a form of witness which is em 
pirically falsifiable. "Beyond . . . existential claims, there are . . . all 
the other utterances in Scripture and tradition that are not only pro 
perly factual but also subject to empirical falsification" [italics mine].28 
These include not only utterances found in the history of Christianity, 
but those described as part of "the actual life of the believer." The 
utterances in the actual life of the believer "are not quite so ad 
ventitious to this [Christian] witness"29 as are the biblical and histor 
ical ones. We are told further that "since the Christian life, like 
human life otherwise, is quite impossible without making or implying 
such claims, Christian belief, at least, has a necessary, if only indirect, 
relation even to empirical falsification [italics mine]."30 
Thus there is faith itself which underlies the proclamational 
witness of faith, and it is the proclamation of faith, not faith itself, 
which is falsifiable. But faith is, contrary to this claim, proclamational. 
Ogden writes: 
Faith as such is obviously the extreme contrast to objectify 
ing knowledge . . . and this is true, even though, as itself a 
type of understanding, faith Is quite distinct from immediate 
27. "Falsification and Belief," p. 42. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid., p. 43. 
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feeling and somehow identical with the other points lying 
closer to the opposite end of the continuum. Insofar as it is 
conscious-and it is doubtful whether one can really speak of 
an "unconscious faith"?It is already explicit as some form of 
belief, although such belief represents the maximum of per 
sonal concern and involvement [italics mine].31 
If faith is both a strictly existential phenomenon and yet identical 
with the other points along the continuum, that is, forms of witness 
and perhaps theology itself, it appears that Ogden is inconsistent. On 
the one hand he describes a continuum from existential self-understand 
ing (nonproclamational) to witness (unrefined proclamation about the 
self-understanding) to theology (highly reflective proclamation, account 
ing both for witness and the self-understanding). On the other hand 
he describes the same continuum as containing, at its lower end, faith 
as some sort of witness, i.e., as some sort of proclamation. The 
continuum appears to be entirely constructed of forms of (verbal) 
proclamation (including faith), and yet Ogden denies that faith is 
proclamation. 
Perhaps faith as proclamation is to be understood as statements 
correlated to beliefs about concern and involvement. Ogden's claims 
about the necessary empirical connections among Christian life, action, 
and faith, support the interpretation that faith cannot be merely an 
existential phenomenon; that it must result not only in existentially 
falsifiable claims, but in empirically falsifiable claims as well. That 
faith is not unconscious indicates that it is involved with believing 
propositions which objectively describe reality, propositions that have 
empirical import as opposed to mere existential import. Yet Ogden 
denies that the empirical utterances resulting as the believer's life is 
lived are truly religious.32 I fail to see how this claim can be success 
fully made, given his other remarks. One possibility is to suggest that 
every utterance of the believer is to be demythologized. But then what 
is the force of the "necessary" in "necessary if only indirect relation to 
empirical falsification," and why are the utterances which result from 
the believer's life not quite so adventitious to the Christian witness as 
the biblical or historical ones? Several of Ogden's comments suggest a 
special role for these empirical assertions, yet he denies that they are 
truly religious. 
31. "Theology and Objectivity," p. 81. 
32. "Falsification and Theology," p. 43. 
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In summary, Ogden believes that the foundational religious asser 
tions are metaphysical only. That is, they are neither empirically nor 
existentially falsifiable, but are open only to the "falsifiability" of self 
contradiction. Since they are necessary truths, showing them to be 
meaningful is identical to showing them to be true. To show one to be 
false is to show it to be self-contradictory, and thus both meaningless 
and necessarily false. Other religious claims, those of the Christian 
witness, are existentially falsifiable. In other words, since the world 
and the creatures it contains could have been different, claims about 
the world and other creatures are meaningful. They are ultimately 
meaningful, however, only as demythologized, since in their mythical 
form they appear to be open to empirical falsification. Faith, as exis 
tential self-understanding, underlies all these proclamations, the major 
differences between witness and theology being that theology reflects 
not only on faith but also on witness, and that the foundational theolo 
gical assertions are necessary as well as existential. The final cate 
gory, that of the witness of faith or faith as expressed in the life of 
the believer, does not fit well into Ogden's description of the con 
tinuum from faith to theology. While Ogden denies the possibility of 
empirically falsifiable religious assertions, some of his comments suggest 
that the expressions of faith in the life ?f the believer ought to be 
considered as empirically falsifiable. Perhaps the continuum ought to 
be modified to account for this matter. Perhaps there is an additional 
class of religious utterances on the lowest level of the continuum, 
which would then go from empirically falsifiable to existentially falsifi 
able to unfalsifiable or necessary statements. These last statements 
have a twofold criterion of meaningfulness (and thus truth); they are 
verified by all experience and falsifiable only in the special sense of 
being open to the test of self-contradiction. Such a reconstruction 
turns the continuum into a continuum of assertions under which lies 
existential self-understanding. The original model would have to place 
life itself on a continuum along with language. This is a continuum 
which does justice neither to language nor to Ogden's own claims. 
III. 
The confusion surrounding the continuum from faith to theology can 
perhaps be cleared up by Ogden either by further explanation and 
exposition or by some modification of the notions involved. I will not 
say anything further about it here. Rather, I turn my attention to 
three other problems, all of which stand independently of the confusion 
in his general theory. The first deals with the necessary metaphysical 
claims, the second with truth and meaningfulness, and the third with 
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the criterion of truth. 
For Ogden, "God exists" is a foundational religious assertion. It 
is what I have labeled a "necessary existential claim." As a necessary 
existential claim, it is verified by all experience and falsified by none. 
In other words, any state of affairs shows the assertion to be true. If 
so, the existence of evil must not only be compatible with "God exists" 
but show it to be true. On a traditional view of God, the existence of 
evil, or at least the existence of so much seemingly gratuitous evil, 
counts against the claim that "God exists," not for it. But then Ogden 
is not a traditional theologian. Perhaps his view of God as process 
allows him to take evil as support for the assertion that God exists. 
If so, this criticism comes to no more than noting that the process 
God is less than satisfying to those who do not think evil should count 
in favor of God's existence.33 
The second problem is perhaps more substantial. Normally the 
notion of justifying a belief is connected to showing the proposition 
believed to be true. In Ogden's case, this connection is stronger than 
one might suspect. Recall that on the level of necessary statements, 
showing to be meaningful is identical to showing to be true. 
Ogden would not disagree, I think, with the further claim that on this 
level, to justify one need only show to be meaningful. Thus in 
this limited case, the notion of truth is collapsed into the notion of 
meaningfulness. That is, the criterion of truth is the same as the 
criterion of meaningfulness. This is to be expected. Something unex 
pected, however, is that the same claim is true on the lower levels, the 
levels of contingent metaphysical assertions, mythical assertions, and 
empirical assertions. 
Ogden's definition of truth as "worthy of being believed" or 
"deserving credence" sounds very much like a judgment one might make 
in attempting to justify a belief. In attempting to justify a religious 
belief to another person, am I not, in part, recommending that belief to 
her? At least that is the goal. In Ogden's program, when one justifies 
a theological assertion, one has two ends: to check the assertion's 
appropriateness vis ? vis its meaning and the Christian witness, and to 
check on its understandability vis ? vis its meaning and truth. One is 
attempting to make religious belief meaningful and hence acceptable. 
Some theists holding a traditional view 
toward God's existence. See Michael 
Problem of Evil," American Philosophical 
40. 
of God think that evil may count 
L. Peterson, "Recent Work on the 
Quarterly 20 (October 1983): 321 
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But to check on its meaning is to do no more than to show that it is 
existentially falsifiable. Once is shown to be meaningful in this way, 
has one justified the belief? I think Ogden's answer must be "yes." If 
so, isn't he committed to recommending for belief? And if he is so 
committed, how is showing meaningful different from showing true? 
It looks as if what should probably be true only of necessary assertions 
is true also of assertions on the lower levels of the continuum, viz., 
that if an assertion is meaningful it is true. This is, at best, a curious 
result. There are at least two ways around it. One is to deny that 
truth is to be defined as "worthy of belief." The second is to deny 
that showing to be justified is identical with showing to be mean 
ingful. I will not comment on the second of these. I will suggest, 
however, one reason, related to the third problem, to opt for the first. 
The third problem is perhaps best exemplified by considering 
Ogden's statement of the criterion for the truth of myths. Mythical 
assertions are true "insofar as they so explicate our unforfeitable 
assurance that life Is worth while that the understanding of faith they 
represent cannot be falsified by the essential conditions of life itself 
[italics his].34 My concern is with the force of "cannot be falsified." 
The criteria for truth are to vary field to field. There is to be a 
different criterion for each class of statements. But if the criterion 
for mythical truth is any indication, that claim must be false on 
Ogden's own grounds. The criterion for the truth of myth reads as if 
mythical assertions, to put it simply, must correspond to the facts 
about life. Couldn't a similar claim be made about an empirical asser 
tion? For example, couldn't I suggest the following: scientific asser 
tions are true insofar as they so explicate our beliefs about the exter 
nal world that the understanding of the external world they represent 
cannot be falsified by the essential facts of the external world itself? 
Isn't the criterion of truth really more basic than either of these two 
suggested criteria; isn't it just that any statement is true, so long as 
it explicates our belief that p, such that the understanding of it 
represents cannot be falsified by the fact that p? 
Perhaps Ogden might reply that "cannot be falsified" should be 
interpreted in a stronger sense than I have allowed here. It seems 
open to suggest that mythical assertions cannot be falsified by any 
state of affairs. But this leads to a dilemma. That is, either "cannot 
be falsified" means that mythical assertions, to be true, must be neces 
sary assertions (which contradicts Ogden's claims about existential 
34. "Myth and Truth," p. 116. 
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falsification), or "cannot be falsified" means "must correspond to the 
facts", in which case the distinction between the criteria for truth and 
the meaning of truth is blurred (which indicates the necessity for a 
modification of Ogden's views on truth). 
The force of these last two criticisms, along with the confusion 
noted in section II, is to suggest that there are some fundamental 
issues with which Professor Ogden needs to deal. His notions of truth, 
falsification, justification, and meaning, when taken together against 
the background of his general theory of religious language, lead to 
subtle incoherencies. 
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